La investigación que se presenta es mixta. El objetivo fue describir las emociones generadas en contextos virtuales de profesores de instituciones educativas en países de habla hispana. La recolección de datos fue a través de un cuestionario con escala de tipo Likert La muestra fue de 37 profesores de países de habla hispana. Los resultados mostraron la existencia de emociones positivas, negativas y ambiguas. Las emociones fueron generadas por experiencias y creencias de si mismos, de sus estudiantes y sobre la (...) tecnología. Se concluyó la importancia de generar recursos educativo digitales que permitan la identificación y gestión emocional. (shrink)

"Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us," writes Alva Noe. "It is something we do." In Action in Perception, Noe argues that perception and perceptual consciousness depend on capacities for action and thought — that ...

Opposing Viewpoints is the leading source for libraries and classrooms in need of current-issue materials. The viewpoints are selected from a wide range of highly respected sources and publications.

Introduction: free presence -- Conscious reference -- Fragile styles -- Real presence -- Experience of the world in time -- Presence in pictures -- On over-intellectualizing the intellect -- Ideology and the third realm.

Most growth models for complex networks consider networks comprising a single connected block or island, which contains all the nodes in the network. However, it has been demonstrated that some large complex networks have more than one island, with an island size distribution obeying a power-law function Is~s-α. This paper introduces a growth model that considers the emergence of islands as the network grows. The proposed model addresses the following two features: the probability that a new island is generated decreases (...) as the network grows and new islands are created with a constant probability at any stage of the growth. In the first case, the model produces an island size distribution that decays as a power-law Is~s-α with a fixed exponent α=1 and in-degree distribution that decays as a power-law Qi~i-γ with γ=2. When the second case is considered, the model describes island size and in-degree distributions that decay as a power-law with 2<α<∞ and 2<γ<∞, respectively. (shrink)

Some cognitive states — e.g. states of thinking, calculating, navigating — may be partially external because, at least sometimes, these states depend on the use of symbols and artifacts that are outside the body. Maps, signs, writing implements may sometimes be as inextricably bound up with the workings of cognition as neural structures or internally realized symbols (if there are any). According to what Clark and Chalmers [1998] call active externalism, the environment can drive and so partially constitute cognitive processes. (...) Where does the mind stop and the rest of the world begin? If active externalism is right, then the boundary cannot be drawn at the skull. The mind reaches – or at least can reach --- beyond the limits of the body out into the world. (shrink)

There is a traditional scepticism about whether the world "out there" really is as we perceive it. A new breed of hyper-sceptics now challenges whether we even have the perceptual experience we think we have. According to these writers, perceptual consciousness is a kind of false consciousness. This view grows out of the discovery of such phenomena as change blindness and inattentional blindness, which show that we can all be quite blind to changes taking place before our very eyes. Such (...) radical scepticism has acute and widespread implications for the study of perception and consciousness. The writings collected in this volume explore these implications. The contributors are scientists and philosophers at the forefront of this research, and include well-known authors such as psychologists Susan Blackmore and Arien Mack, and philosophers Andy Clark and Daniel Dennett. They have an gift for bringing these paradoxical issues to life and sharing their excitement with the non-specialist. (shrink)

In this paper I explore a brand of scepticism about perceptual experience that takes its start from recent work in psychology and philosophy of mind on change blindness and related phenomena. I argue that the new scepticism rests on a problematic phenomenology of perceptual experience. I then consider a strengthened version of the sceptical challenge that seems to be immune to this criticism. This strengthened sceptical challenge formulates what I call the problem of perceptual presence. I show how this problem (...) can be addressed by drawing on an enactive or sensorimotor approach to perceptual consciousness. Our experience of environmental detail consists in our access to that detail thanks to our possession of practical knowledge of the way in which what we do and sensory stimulation depend on each other. (shrink)

PurposeGraham Priest has recently argued that the distinctive trait of classical mathematics is that the conditional of its underlying logic—that is, classical logic—is extensional. In this article, I aim to present an alternate explanation of the specificity of classical mathematics.MethodI examine Priest's argument for his claim and show its shortcomings. Then I deploy a model-theoretic presentation of logics that allows comparing them, and the mathematics based on them, more fine-grainedly.ResultsSuch a model-theoretic presentation of logics suggests that the specific character of (...) classical logic consists in the structure that it confers to its truth values and in the structure of the evaluation indices of its formulas, and that this trait is useful to explain the specific character of the logics and the mathematics based on them.ConclusionThe extensionality of the conditional in classical logic is a by-product of other structural features of a logic, which are more likely to be what gives a kind of mathematics based on it its specific character. (shrink)

An analysis of Nicholas of Cusa’s conception of the power of judgment that shows it enables morality as well as cognition.

Se intenta una contribución al conocimiento de la enseñanza de la filosofía en el Colegio de San Carlos de Buenos Aires hacia fines del siglo XVIII. Para ello se examinan las propuestas de Juan Baltasar Maziel (1727-1788) para dicho Colegio en materia de Filosofía, Teología y Derecho. Esta información se complementa con la exposición de otras ideas jurídico-políticas de Maziel, en el contexto de su actividad eclesiástica. The subject is the contribution of Juan Baltasar Maziel (1727-1778) to the teaching of (...) Philosophy, Theology and Law in the Colegio de San Carlos of Buenos Aires, in the last third of the XVIIIth Century. In addition, other political ideas of Maziel are considered. (shrink)

La propuesta tiene como objetivo, plantear un modelo educativo sostenible respondiendo a las necesidades de los países en vías de desarrollo en materia de economía, sociedad, medio ambiente y cultura teniendo como principio fundamental el análisis de efectos que pueden poner en riesgo el bienestar de las generaciones futuras ante fenómenos como la escolaridad masiva, la correlación entre grado de estudio y movilidad social, los efectos de las subvenciones a fondo perdido en eldesarrollodeinnovacióntecnológica y no tecnológica y la preservación de (...) la cultura en los diferentes niveles educativos analizando las prospectivas de los modelos educativos; teniendo como directriz el Informe Brutland (1987) presentado en la comisión Mundial del Medio Ambiente y desarrollo de Naciones Unidas creada en 1983 y la Declaración en la sexagésimo novena sesión plenaria de naciones Unidas en 2010 sobre la cultura como cuarto pilar del desarrollo sostenible.Consecuentemente la propuesta tendrá como sustento los indicadores de la Organización para la Cooperación y el Desarrollo Económico (OCDE) de sus publicaciones de Education at a Glance 2014, Teaching and Learning International Survey (TALIS) 2013 y OECD Science, Technologyand Industry Scoreboard 2013, para efecto de realizar un análisis comparativo entre países en vías de desarrollo. (shrink)

Correspondence: Alva Noë, Department of Philosophy, University of California, Berkeley CA 94720-2390, USA. _Email: [email protected]_ Evan Thompson, Philosophy Department, York University, 4700 Keele Street, North York, Ontario, M3J 1P3, Canada. _Email: [email protected]_.

As perceivers we are able to keep track of the ways in which our perceptual experience depends on what we do. This capacity, which Hurley calls perspectival self- consciousness, is a special instance of our more general ability as perceivers to keep track of how things are. I argue that one upshot of this is that perspectival self- consciousness, like the ability to perceive more generally, relies on our possession of conceptual skills.

The topic of this paper is phenomenology. How should we think of phenomenology – the discipline or activity of investigating experience itself – if phenomenology is to be a genuine source of knowledge? This is related to the question whether phenomenology can make a contribution to the empirical study of human or animal experience. My own view is that it can. But only if we make a fresh start in understanding what phenomenology is and can be.

In the “Notes for Lectures on “Private Experience‘ and “Sense Data‘", Wittgenstein endorsed one kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis and rejected another. This paper argues that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis that Wittgenstein endorsed is the thin end of the wedge that precludes a Wittgensteinian critique of the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected. I will attempt to explicate the difference between the innocuous and dangerous scenarios, to give arguments in favor of the coherence of the dangerous scenario, (...) and to show that the standard arguments to the effect that the dangerous scenario is impossible are flawed or ineffective against the version of the dangerous scenario whose coherence I will be advocating. I will also agree with what I think is Wittgenstein’s position that the kind of inverted spectrum hypothesis he rejected lets qualia in the door, where qualia are qualities of experiential states whose phenomenal character cannot be expressed in natural language. Further, I will argue that acknowledging the coherence of the innocuous inverted spectrum commits Wittgenstein to the coherence of the dangerous inverted spectrum, thereby undermining Wittgenstein’s deepest views about the mind. In other work, I have used the inverted spectrum hypothesis as an argument against functionalism and representationism, but here the focus is on its role in arguing for the possibility of qualia. (shrink)

This paper investigates a new species ofskeptical reasoning about visual experience that takesits start from developments in perceptual science(especially recent work on change blindness andinattentional blindness). According to thisskepticism, the impression of visual awareness of theenvironment in full detail and high resolution isillusory. I argue that the new skepticism depends onmisguided assumptions about the character ofperceptual experience, about whether perceptualexperiences are ''internal'' states, and about how bestto understand the relationship between a person''s oranimal''s perceptual capacities and the brain-level orneural processes (...) on which they depend. I propose aconception of perceptual experience as a form ofskillful engagement with the environment on the partof the whole person or animal. (shrink)

Experiments on scene perception and change blindness suggest that the visual system does not construct detailed internal models of a scene. These experiments therefore call into doubt the traditional view that vision is a process in which detailed representations of the environment must be constructed. The non-existence of such detailed representations, however, does not entail that we do not perceive the detailed environment. The “grand illusion hypothesis” that our visual world is an illusion rests on (1) a problematic “reconstructionist” conception (...) of vision, and (2) a misconception about the character of perceptual experience. (shrink)

Las artes visuales, marginadas de otras áreas del conocimiento, por la fragmentación epistemológica propi-ciada por el positivismo y con afán de responder al desarrollo vertiginoso y complejo de nuevas tecnologías, han perdido la más importante de sus tareas, la reflexión. La especulación sobre la acción artística y la entrega de juicios críticos acerca de sus manifestaciones implica la introspección y el pensar sobre sus procesos y parámetros de desarrollo. Imaginar y crear en las artes visuales se ha convertido en las (...) reacciones espontáneas resultantes de la intuición del instante, olvidando etapas importantes de concentración, abstracción, especulación y transformación de la experiencia estética. Hoy las artes son la provocación de una cadena de reacciones físicas: repulsión, sorpresa, rechazo, etc., de las transgresiones a la forma y no al fondo, hay un abismo entre el pensamiento y la razón. Hay un olvido de los contenidos, por los que lucharon Klee, Kandinsky, Arnheim o Gombrich y que hizo comprensible la obra de Cézanne, Duchamp o Beuys. Se trata de una reflexión sobre la importancia del dominio epistemológico en las artes visuales, una llamada a regresar a su conceptualización y a reconstruir la filosofía y la teoría del arte visual de nuestro tiempo. Estas disciplinas tienen un aspecto teórico referente a los conceptos que las sustentan, un aspecto técnico concerniente a los medios por los cuales se crea la obra o la acción artística y un aspecto poético, que establece un nexo entre quien crea la obra y quienes la perciben y contemplan, éstos entre sí y entre éstos y la obra. Lo anterior requiere de los conocimientos indis-pensables para reconocer y comprender tanto el excedente de sentido de las artes visuales como la socialización sus valores culturales, son indispensables las estructuras y concepciones teóricas porque, de un mismo objeto o acción se dan diversas interpretaciones igualmente válidas, siempre y cuando estén sustentadas cognoscitivamente. Las artes visuales son una unidad de saber, un conjunto de conocimientos unificados merced a ciertos principios, pero no es un cuerpo de verdades cerradas, al contrario, se hallan en relación permanente y dinámica con otros ámbitos cognoscitivos, influyen en algunos y son influenciadas por otros. La conceptuación de las artes visuales es valiosa porque tiene efectos directos en la forma de pensamiento, en la conducta y en las acciones y decisiones de los seres humanos, en virtud de que se conciben como generadoras de valores y bienes culturales. (shrink)

_Philosophy of Art_ is a textbook for undergraduate students interested in the topic of philosophical aesthetics. It introduces the techniques of analytic philosophy as well as key topics such as the representational theory of art, formalism, neo-formalism, aesthetic theories of art, neo-Wittgensteinism, the Institutional Theory of Art. as well as historical approaches to the nature of art. Throughout, abstract philosophical theories are illustrated by examples of both traditional and contemporary art including frequent reference to the avant-garde in this way enriching (...) the readers understanding of art theory as well as the appreciation of art. Unique features of the textbook are: * chapter summaries * summaries of major theories of art and suggested analyses of the important categories used when talking and thinking of art * annotated suggested readings at the ends of chapters. Also available in this series: _Epistemology_ Pb: 0-415-13043-3: £12.99 _Ethics_ Pb: 0-415-15625-4: £11.99 _Metaphysics_ Pb: 0-415-14034-X: £12.99 _Philosophy of Mind_ Pb: 0-415-13060-3: £11.99 _Philosophy of Religion_ Pb: 0-415-13214-2: £12.99. (shrink)

The main idea of this book is that perceiving is a way of acting. Perception is not something that happens to us, or in us. It is something we do. Think of a blind person tap-tapping his or her way around a cluttered space, perceiving that space by touch, not all at once, but through time, by skillful probing and movement. This is, or at least ought to be, our paradigm of what perceiving is. The world makes itself available to (...) the perceiver through physical movement and interaction. In this book I argue that all perception is touch-like in this way: perceptual experience acquires content thanks to our possession of bodily skills. What we perceive is determined by what we do ; it is determined by what we are ready to do. In ways I try to make precise, we enact our perceptual experience; we act it out. (shrink)

"El libro "Ensayos sobre pensamiento mexicano" es una propuesta reflexiva que reúne seis diferentes acercamientos a un tema común: México en el contexto del siglo XX. Los capítulos que lo integran se entrelazan a partir de dos horizontes de análisis, por un lado, el amplio espectro de la cultura con la diversidad de pliegues y posibilidades discursivas que le distinguen, y por el otro, la controversia siempre emergente que caracteriza a la esfera política. En esta confrontación y complementariedad radica el (...) principal aporte del texto, al brindar los elementos esenciales para un trabajo crítico a partir de la filosofía que centra sus problemas de estudio en el tejido social. Aunque los diferentes ensayos nos proponen una extensa gama de referentes históricos, lo hacen siempre conservando el tratamiento filosófico de los tópicos planteados. Aquí se muestra la conformación de un país que emerge después de tres siglos de colonización, que ha pretendido hacer la recuperación de un pasado pletórico de significado y que llega a su inevitable enfrentamiento con un mundo de interacción creciente allende sus fronteras. Pero no sólo se traza la perspectiva que recoge acontecimientos y personajes de una historia nacional, también se suma la mirada desde el exilio español avecindado en México, lo que aporta un punto de vista indudablemente enriquecedor acerca del espacio y el tiempo de una memoria que recupera circunstancias y propone los elementos de crítica frente a una razón totalitaria que fue factor común de varios países durante el atribulado siglo XX"--En la cubierta. (shrink)

En este ensayo se examina de manera crítica el desarrollo de la filosofía analítica y, en particular, de la filosofía analítica latinoamericana. Se propone que esta última adopte un giro político y uno pedagógico con el fin de recuperar su espíritu original y reconectarse con la tradición intelectual latinoamericana. This essay is a critical examination of the development of analytic philosophy and, in particular, of Latin American analytic philosophy. It is argued that the latter ought to adopt a political and (...) pedagogical turn in order to recover its original spirit and to be reconnected to Latin American intelectual tradition. (shrink)

Filosofía mexicana (una reconsideración crítica) -- Filosofía en México/filosofía mexicana -- Dos apuntes sobre filosofía mexicana -- ¿Qué filosofía mexicana para el presente -- Sobre la actualidad filosófica de Ramos -- Emilio Uranga, los libros y la filosofía -- José Emilio Pacheco como crítico del relatio patriótico -- "...verde es el dorado árbol de la vida" : notas sobre el pensamiento de José Revueltas.

This paper looks at two puzzles raised by the phenomenon of inattentional blindness. First, how can we see at all if, in order to see, we must first perceptually attend to that which we see? Second, if attention is required for perception, why does it seem to us as if we are perceptually aware of the whole detailed visual field when it is quite clear that we do not attend to all that detail? We offer a general framework for thinking (...) about perception and perceptual consciousness that addresses these questions and we propose, in addition, an informal account of the relation between attention and consciousness. On this view, perceptual awareness is a species of attention. (shrink)

A selection of essays written by one of the leading critics of film over the last two decades, this volume examines theoretical aspects of film and television through penetrating analyses of such genres as soap opera, documentary, comedy, and such topics as 'sight gags', film metaphor, point-of-view editing, and movie music. Throughout, individual films are considered in depth. Carroll's essays, moreover, represent the cognitivist turn in film studies, containing in-depth criticism of existing approaches to film theory, and heralding a new (...) approach. (shrink)

This paper investigates the idea that perception can be, at once, a mode of direct awareness of the world and an encounter, in the first instance, with mere appearances. In developing this point, I introduce a sensorimotor account of perception according to which the senses are ways of exploring the environment mediated by different patterns of sensorimotor contingency (i.e. by the distinctive ways in which what the perceiver does affects how things appear).

In the past decade, the notion of a neural correlate of consciousness has become a focal point for scientific research on consciousness. A growing number of investigators believe that the first step toward a science of consciousness is to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. Indeed, Francis Crick has gone so far as to proclaim that ‘we need to discover the neural correlates of consciousness. For this task the primate visual system seems especially attractive. No longer need one spend time (...) attempting to endure the tedium of philosophers perpetually disagreeing with each other. Consciousness is now largely a scientific problem’. Yet the question of what it means to be a neural correlate of consciousness is actually far from straightforward, for it involves fundamental empirical, methodological, and philosophical issues about the nature of consciousness and its relationship to the brain. Even if one assumes, as we do, that states of consciousness causally depend on states of the brain, one can nevertheless wonder in what sense there is, or could be, such a thing as a neural correlate of consciousness. (shrink)

A significant impediment to the study of perceptual consciousness is our dependence on simplistic ideas about what experience is like. This is a point that has been made by Wittgenstein, and by philosophers working in the Phenomenological Tradition, such as Husserl and Merleau-Ponty. Importantly, it is an observation that has been brought to the fore in recent discussions of consciousness among philosophers and cognitive scientists who have come to feel the need for a more rigorous phenomenology of experience. The central (...) thought of this paper is that art can make a needed contribution to the study of perceptual consciousness. The work of some artists can teach us about perceptual consciousness by furnishing us with the opportunity to have a special kind of reflective experience. In this way, art can be a tool for phenomenological investigation. The paper focuses on the work of Richard Serra and offers a comparison of his work with that of Tony Smith. (shrink)

Modernist Objects is a unique mix of cultural studies, literature, and visual arts applied to the discrete materiality of modernist objects. Contributors explore the many tensions surrounding the modernist relationship to objects, things, products and artIfacts through the prism of poetry, prose, visual arts, culture and crafts.

_Philosophy of Motion Pictures_ is a first-of-its-kind, bottom-up introduction to this bourgeoning field of study. Topics include film as art, medium specificity, defining motion pictures, representation, editing, narrative, emotion and evaluation. Clearly written and supported with a wealth of examples Explores characterizations of key elements of motion pictures –the shot, the sequence, the erotetic narrative, and its modes of affective address.

Many current neurophysiological, psychophysical, and psychological approaches to vision rest on the idea that when we see, the brain produces an internal representation of the world. The activation of this internal representation is assumed to give rise to the experience of seeing. The problem with this kind of approach is that it leaves unexplained how the existence of such a detailed internal representation might produce visual consciousness. An alternative proposal is made here. We propose that seeing is a way of (...) acting. It is a particular way of exploring the environment. Activity in internal representations does not generate the experience of seeing. The out- side world serves as its own, external, representation. The experience of seeing occurs when the organism masters what we call the gov- erning laws of sensorimotor contingency. The advantage of this approach is that it provides a natural and principled way of accounting for visual consciousness, and for the differences in the perceived quality of sensory experience in the different sensory modalities. Sev- eral lines of empirical evidence are brought forward in support of the theory, in particular: evidence from experiments in sensorimotor adaptation, visual “filling in,” visual stability despite eye movements, change blindness, sensory substitution, and color perception. (shrink)